Plessner's flat against the "modern Anticartesianismus" directed accused to face the "mind-body problem 'not by' them ', ie the Anticartesianisten, a supposedly more" problem-free, original layer of existence and of existence " go back, not only could, I suppose, be directed against the life-world theorists - it could also, regardless of original Plessner Intention that it be against the "intercorporeality" by Bernhard Waldenfels. (See ders, the physical self. Lectures on the phenomenology of the body, Frankfurt aM 2000, S.284ff., S.292ff. S.302f.) Intercorporeality Also this seems to me the concept of excentric positionality circumscribed Leib/Körper- problem to be withdrawn and to a certain extent by, Intersubjektivierung obscure ': no longer "habeas corpus", but "habeamus intercorporalitas. Subjective individuality is Waldenfels no longer a problem - only one of Cartesianism against whom he is addressing. (For example, in his review of Hermann Schmitz: Waldenfels 2000, p.278-284)
intercorporeality is described as a sphere of Waldenfels between "own body" and "foreign body". (See Waldenfels 2000, p.287) In order directs Waldenfels attention from the subject and the individual path to social processes faced by the subject only becomes visible as a party, which is associated with forest rock with a devaluation of its (ie the subject) position . This is reflected among others in Waldenfels' - from the difference of body / mind / spirit reminiscent - Classification of "strictly private" as subjective, the objective lenses as "trans subjective" and the Inter-subjectivity as the "sphere the intermediate, "so as intercorporeality. (See Waldenfels 2000 S.292f.) Subjectivity, the subjective consciousness, the subjective individual, the 'person', as will always be assigned to subjectivity in Waldenfels no responsibility for themselves and their own initiative, but only by Otherwise her: "A decision is not the result of individuals ...". Decision processes occur only "in the group" now and are "marked through it." (See Waldenfels 2000, p.303)
Waldenfels himself admits that "after mixing, looks like a confusion, so that you can not say clearly what one does and what the other, and the responsibilities threaten to blur. "(Waldenfels 2000, p.304) But he turns objected that the" question of who ... no clear-cut answer admits "(Waldenfels 2000, p.304) -. against this lax use of subjective responsibility, I have some objections.
My main objection is to the top even as a "mind / body problem" mentioned eccentric positionality of human nature. This provides a physical limit of the physical-world relevance of human action. We know as individuals to our well-being and vulnerability. We as individuals all the risk of existence. We are never only social decision-making indirectly involved, but it always directly affected. Because we have a body and can not escape him as the consequences of our decisions or the decisions of others. We are here and now present, following from the inside to the outside of our needs, such as from the outside in the forward-us needs the other suspended.
Plessner So far, the forest rock in "The bodily self," although occasionally, referring to him, quoted, with which he deals but not really. This is particularly annoying because Waldenfels the difference between inside and outside, that is the body of Doppelaspektivität Do- and body-being, the central moment described by Plessner eccentric positionality just as useless "dichotomy" dismiss ("We have ... from the beginning nothing of this dichotomy ..." (cf. Waldenfels 2000 S.221f.)) but at the same time has no problem with it, to refer to Plessner's "duality as" eccentric position 'of the people "(cf. Waldenfels 2000, p.254), without this term, to which exactly one of these Doppelaspektivität inside and outside, also to differentiate in the least.
Waldenfels' approach is a priori a language-related phenomenology, all preverbal states only as a linguistic Descriptions take note, so there can of course not "pure introspection," just because "it shall be a description always in a language that is not only my own." (See Waldenfels 2000, p.221) Since, a "Noli me tangere", as formulated as Plessner identification of mental states to come, not even in sight.
To my concept of self-effects from Waldenfels' to distinguish language oriented phenomenology, I could perhaps try as hard as' call and Waldenfels' concept of intercorporeality as' soft '. , Soft 'is his concept, because it the subject added is due to its limited perspective (see Waldenfels 2000 S.292f.) do not own position. Restricting consideration includes also the site of my very subject approach - apart from the fact that in principle, each location is limited in perspective. But he also includes a restriction Gegenüberstelltsein: an eccentric position. Waldenfels does not understand this eccentric positionality of man, this simultaneity of in-being and comparison-being, and can therefore start with a position that is justified "from nowhere", nothing. (See Waldenfels 2000, p.283) His proposal, in respect of the difference of speak to "the spirit and nature" of "self-differentiation" (cf. ibid), but does take the place of the rejected "by him" from nowhere "just another bland description of the same facts, the Plessner with the eccentric Positionaliät long in sufficient manner the term has to be related. be the subject she can not have ', in an original, self:
, soft' would Waldenfels' subject concept finally, because according to him the objects, which turns to the subject to think in advance only from other manufacturers are 'founded, founding manner. Perception of taken in advance of forest rock as something that the consciousness of its objects are not about, 'but the objects that we can have her only by the Other, "dispossessed" (cf. Waldenfels 2000, S.294) - as could there be a separate independent consciousness of objects!
Consciousness arises but one with its objects, according to my 'hard' concept that so hard ', because it (the subject) has its own point - again in his articles. What else? Just as the subjective consciousness of his body, has ',' has it his subjects, and it will have both full and not just an arm or a foot. My concept of subjectivity is a concept of myself, and that includes that I have a personal, subjective interest in the ownership of goods. I will try to share my article with others - I need the perspectives of others on my subject, without which he would not be complete - but I will raise it against a misinterpretation, to a transformation into something else when I see him can defend. I will contact me so against any attempt to him from me. I do need the courage to use my own mind, without the guidance of someone else.
This concept of self possessions does not contradict the idea that the objects are alien to consciousness, because they oppose him. This also corresponds to the eccentricity of the people. He can not 1: 1 to incorporate the world, as little as he wishes his 1: 1 can implement in the world. But that that's part of the quality of the action in the world, that seem to us the victories as the most satisfying that we had to implement against a resistance, a satisfaction that we can not provide pure fantasy or fiction.
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