(About Promethean shame, p.21-95;. The world as a die Phantom and Philosophical Reflections on radio and television, p.97-211;. Being without time to Beckett's play "En attendant Godot ', p. 213-231; about the bomb and the roots of our apocalypse-blindness, p.233-308)
first Images, Phantoms and information
second Wrong worlds (coram publico)
third Wrong worlds (Verbiederung)
4th Wrong worlds (production)
5th Wrong worlds (technology)
6th Wrong worlds (personal responsibility)
7th Man and Nature
8th homo, excentricus'
9th Sketches of an aesthetic education
In my post from 14/12/2010, I had made some reflections on false consciousness. These considerations are now following further consideration at the wrong life-world. So I'd like to hold on to the beginning, that I have the life-world in the first place for a phenomenon of consciousness and therefore consider it necessary to the falsehood of consciousness has its share of no less necessary. At the same time, there are - as with consciousness - a non-essential falsity of the living world, that is a falsehood, which comes from the misuse of our minds. And here again we have the formula of the Enlightenment: we and our lack of courage 'fault wrong in this life world, and it is ultimately just a matter of us to put her right in a relationship in order to overcome these non-essential, unnecessary falsehood . That we have this opportunity, despite all imposed falsehood of consciousness and life, is only in the fact that the man himself and positioned eccentrically to the world.
It is very remarkable that different - in the rest of Plessner's anthropological work seems to have no knowledge - in his first essay, "On Promethean shame" (antiquatedness vol.1, p.21-95) an analysis of the physical modes of response of shame, provides the highly reminiscent of Plessner's "laughing and crying," - without, however, in the least to the described by Plessner "eccentric positionality" push forward. Remember: Plessner describes laughter as a response to a disturbed situation regarding human and crying as the reaction to a disturbed relationship to the world. Anders describes shame as a response to a disturbed identity relation. (See antiquatedness vol.1, p.65 and elsewhere) And like Plessner this disturbed identity relation leads to a disorientation and a loss of control of physical processes: "Inasmuch as the not-ashamed of the contradictory encounters, is finished ', the shame is not even finished "(antiquatedness vol.1, p.66). - We are not finished with the shame, and accumulated the feeling that without that we can interrupt this process. (See antiquatedness vol.1, S.28f.) The body thus takes the Rule and where we are first turned red with shame, we will be increasing, heat 'redder.
In Plessner ashamed of themselves, would have a chance to save the day: to laugh. The laughter would it solve the situation and free from the inevitable defeat of transforming yes, even the defeat into a triumph. And in this moment we have reached the maximum that makes us human: we have positioned ourselves eccentric!
But as I said, penetrating as far different in his analysis of shame is not available. His analysis remains the shame, was arrested '. But otherwise, however, comes an interesting new definition of intentionality: as Doppelintentionalität. (See antiquatedness vol.1, p.66) This Doppelintentionalität is the one already known in the intentional focus on an object and the other - and that is the reinvention - in targeting an audience that otherwise referred to as "coram" . Coram publico means we are ashamed because we are always watched by an audience. And 'always' feel observed, means even when no audience is present: there is "probably no, even the hermit-like, act ... which is not, even unwittingly, or even privativo modo, a reference to those contemporary world has with which he expects, before their eyes, he is going on or whose eyes he seeks to avoid. Since the classic phenomenology of Husserl (without being clear about this her principle of selection to be) almost exclusively on the analysis of those acts was limited to this, coram 'not revealed openly, had to remain their concept of consciousness always on the border of solipsism. "(Antiquatedness vol.1, p.67) - Concerning Husserl's wrong but different. For what, the term of life other than this world described by Anders "coram"?
So we can even feel ashamed before the world par excellence - and we can even plan dead 'objects Ashamed because we looked at feel of them. (See antiquatedness vol.1, p.79) In other words, such as Plessner is assumed that objects not just dead, but alive for us are. We feel that is looked at over and everywhere and can not miss that look. The other moment of Doppelintentionalität is so unlike that one, looking directly at objects moment, essentially a negative intentionality. After the visit instead of items, we now try to avoid them, we hide from them, "What the shame is intended neither to see her body still can not see them, but not seen by her to be. And that's a relationship that is different from what usually is, intentionality ', so fundamental that it actually would have to invent another term for them "(antiquatedness vol.1, p.67) -. Again is quite different close to Plessner's anthropology, because of what other things he speaks of that as "Noli me tangere", which Plessner describes the soul? Coram publico
This is certainly the very instance that prevents us to use, our own mind, because we him - ashamed of his inadequacy, his individuality, for whatever reason. This coram publico is that "massive social reality "of the other elsewhere (see antiquatedness vol.1, p.204) talks, and which provides a competitive reality for the reality of nature and reality of our individual person. Another level of reality so that stands out from that material, organic, mental and spiritual being, as it has Plessner described in "The levels of the organic and the man." In our consciousness are interwoven so object-relation and social identity related to a purchase, - is collapsing in the case of self-shame, constantly breaks down, ad infinitum. Anders' Doppelintentionalität ultimately means precisely the difference between individual and cultural thinking, which describes Michael Tomasello in his book "The cultural evolution of human thought" (2002).
This mutual entanglement of double intentionality is different, as already indicated, unfolds in such a dramatic impasse. This impasse is solely due to the fact that other apparently had no knowledge of Plessner's anthropology. What opportunities are opening up from the standpoint of an eccentric positionality, and we will discuss yet.
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